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LIKE OIL AND VINEGAR, SITTING JUDGES AND ARBITRATIONS DO NOT MIX: 






 Arbitration has been hailed by the highest court of the land as an expeditious, 
legally binding, alternative to the civil trial.
1
 This federally favored
2
 form of dispute 
resolution is especially attractive to large businesses eyeing arbitration’s traditional 
benefits like: arbitrators with specialized expertise, cost efficiency, expedience, and 
confidentiality. Why then wouldn’t the Delaware State Legislature merge the genius of 
arbitration with its Court of Chancery that is nationally renowned for its ability to 
expertly adjudicate complex business matters, in order to create a revolutionary judicial 
arbitration program? It would, and it did.
3
 One of the law’s most attractive characteristics 




 This article begins by outlining the Delaware law, and analyzing the purposes 
behind its enactment. It then discusses its brief tenure of legality. The article closes with 
an in depth analysis of the suit which brought the Delaware law to its knees,
5
 and 
discusses possible ways the law might have been successful and may work in the future. 
II. THE BEGINNING: THE DELAWARE LAW  
A. The Text: 10 Del. C. §349 
 In April of 2009, the Delaware State Legislature granted arbitral powers to sitting 
judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery by amendment to state rules governing 
disputes.
6
 Contained a single section of the Delaware Code, under three succinct sub-
                                                 
*
 Gellaine T. Newton is a Senior Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1
 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974) (crediting the informality of 
arbitral proceedings as the reason for its ability “to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious 
means for dispute resolution”). 
2
 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that 
section two of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §2, “is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable 
to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act”).  
3
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §349 (West 2009).  
4
 Id. (stating “The Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate business disputes when the 
parties request a member of the Court of Chancery…to arbitrate a dispute”). 
5
 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012). 
6
 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96, 97, and 98. 
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sections, the law outlines the Court of Chancery’s power to arbitrate, the nature of the 
arbitral proceedings and the remedies in cases of appeal.
7
 The law’s text reads: 
(a) The Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate business 
disputes when the parties request a member of the Court of Chancery, or 
such other person as may be authorized under rules of the Court, to 
arbitrate a dispute . . . (b)  Arbitration proceedings shall be considered 
confidential and not of public record until such time, if any, as the 
proceedings are the subject of an appeal . . . (c)  Any application to vacate, 
stay, or enforce an order of the Court of Chancery issued in an arbitration 
proceeding under this section shall be filed with the Supreme Court of this 
State, which shall exercise its authority in conformity with the Federal 
Arbitration Act, and such general principles of law and equity as are not 
inconsistent with that Act.
8
 
The law reads like a standard arbitral provision, save for the fact that it charges officers 
of the court with the duties of arbitrators. The purpose of the Delaware law is “to 
preserve Delaware's pre-eminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving 
disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology matters.” 
9
 
Also, the arbitrations were set to generate substantial revenue for the state. In place was a 
$12,000 filing fee, and a daily arbitration cost of $6,000.
10
 In order for parties to 
participate in the program, at least one party must be a citizen of Delaware,
11
 and one 
must be a “business entity,” as is defined by Delaware law.
12
 One party can fulfill both 
the jurisdictional and business entity requirements, thus making it easier to utilize the 
Delaware Court of Chancery as a ‘big business’ arbitration venue.
13
 Further, should 
monetary damages be requested, the amount in controversy must exceed one million 
dollars; however, this requirement can be sidestepped if equitable remedies are sought in 
conjunction with monetary damages.
14
 
 It seems as if the Delaware Legislature made a sincere effort to pull out all the 
stops to make the court both desirable and easily accessible to corporations. Parties’ 
ability to circumvent the amount in controversy requirement, as explained above, for 
example, allows greater access to Court of Chancery Judges than is otherwise permitted 
by the law because of the Court’s limited equitable jurisdiction.
15
 Also, parties need not 
have a prior agreement to arbitrate future disputes in order to enter the court; all parties 
simply need to consent to arbitration at the time that the dispute arises.
16
 Delaware’s 
commitment to alternate dispute resolution shines through in the law’s provisions, as it 
                                                 
7




 Del. H.B. No. 49, at 4 (2009). 
10
 Tom Hals, Backers of Secret Delaware Arbitrations See Grounds For Appeal, Thomson Reuters 
News & Insight (Sep. 10, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/09_-
_September/Backers_of_secret_Delaware_arbitrations_see_grounds_for_appeal/. 
11
 Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, *4; 10 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 349(a), § 347 (a), (b). 
12






 Id. at *5. 
16
 Id. at *4. 
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allows for the halt of arbitration proceedings at any stage in the process in order to 
commence mediation or reach a settlement agreement.
17
 To sweeten the deal, parties are 
guaranteed an audience before a judge, in the form a preliminary hearing, within ten days 
of filing a petition with the court, and could get a final hearing before a sitting judge as 
soon as ninety days after filing.
18
 Former Chancellor of the Court of Chancery and 
advocate of the Delaware law, William B. Chandler, described the attractive attributes of 
the Delaware law saying: 
[The arbitration program is] a way to save time and money for business 
entities and their investors, while it also would simultaneously preserve 
the Court’s resources and time by reducing the volume of drawn-out trials 
and hearings. The arbitration process is more streamlined, with 
abbreviated decision schedules and reduced emphasis on discovery and 
motion practice – all of the features of regular litigation that make it so 
time-consuming and expensive, and that drain limited judicial resources.
19
 
To the former Chancellor at least, Delaware’s arbitration program was clearly divergent 
from traditional litigation and was an improvement upon the way businesses resolve their 
disputes and upon the way the Delaware judiciary handles the resolve of said disputes. 
1. Shhh, It’s a Secret! 
 Arguably, the most attractive benefit of this judicial arbitration is its dedication to 
secrecy. In compliance with the new duties bestowed upon it, the Delaware Court of 






 in January of 2010. The rules govern the 
Court of Chancery’s administration of arbitrations. Both substantive Rules, 97 and 98, 
contain clear “Confidentiality” provisions. Rule 98 being the more comprehensive of the 
two, reads in pertinent part as follows: 
Arbitration hearings are private proceedings such that only parties and 
their representatives may attend, unless all parties agree otherwise . . . All 
memoranda and work product contained in the case files of an Arbitrator 
are confidential. Any communication made in or in connection with the 
arbitration that relates to the controversy being arbitrated, whether made to 
the Arbitrator or a party, or to any person if made at an arbitration hearing, 
is confidential. Such confidential materials and communications are not 
subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding with the 
following exceptions: (1) where all parties . . . waive the confidentiality, or 
(2) where the confidential materials and communications consist of . . . 
                                                 
17
 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, *6 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012). 
18
 Id. at *5-6. 
19
 JAMS Dispute Resolution Alert, Delaware Business Court Arbitration Program Provides Fast 
Resolution Path For Fortune 500 Company Disputes, (2011),      
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/DRA/DRA-2012-01.pdf. 
20
 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96 (outlining the scope of the Rules). 
21
 DEL. CH. CT. R. 97 (describing “Commencement of Arbitration”). 
22
 DEL. CH. CT. R. 98 (describing the structure of the Arbitration Hearing). 
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tangible evidence otherwise subject to discovery, which were not prepared 
specifically for use in the arbitration hearing.
23
 
The commitment to privacy engraved into this Rule neither rang alarms nor stirred any 
feathers amongst Delaware legal community, for privacy is a standard characteristic of 
contractual agreements to arbitrate.
24
 Former Court of Chancery Chancellor Chandler 
normalized the privacy provision by likening it to other (unchallenged) privacy 
provisions currently in place in Delaware law saying: 
The process, by statute 10 Del. C. section 349(b), is deemed confidential 
in exactly the same manner and for the same reasons that mediation 
proceedings in Chancery are confidential and in exactly the same manner 
and for the same reasons that guardianship and many trust and will matters 
are deemed confidential and not open to the public . . . [M]uch of the 
Court of Chancery’s traditional equity jurisdiction has been conducted in 
confidential proceedings designed to facilitate a socially wholesome 
resolution, an amicable resolution that is much less likely to occur in the 
klieg light setting of a courtroom battle. The same should be true with the 
arbitration process, which is built on a similar business model.
25
 
Other commentators have praised the law’s privacy feature; one was even quoted saying, 
“[the] Court of Chancery is already known far and wide for its ability to adjudicate cases 
quickly. This is the natural evolution of that existing benefit . . . a lot of people do 
business together and may not want to air their dirty linen in public[.]”
26
 Indeed, one 
clear advantage of the secret resolve of disputes is  circumvention of class action 
lawsuits; if the people don’t know, i.e., consumers and shareholders, then there is nothing 
to sue about. Therein lies the problem with this Delaware law; at least as far as the 
current suit is concerned. 
B. The Delaware Law in Action 
Since January of 2011, when the Delaware Court of Chancery adopted Rules 96, 
97, and 98, the court only arbitrated a disappointing six cases.
27
 The six arbitrations only 




 The Federal Arbitration Act does not address the issue of confidentiality, but parties are generally 
encouraged to include  confidentiality provisions in their arbitral agreements. For an informative article 
discussing the need for privacy in arbitration see JAMS Dispute Resolution Alert, Delaware Business 




JAMS Dispute Resolution Alert, Delaware Business Court Arbitration Program Provides Fast 
Resolution Path For Fortune 500 Company Disputes, (2011),  at 2    
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/DRA/DRA-2012-01.pdf.  
26
 Steven M. Davidoff, The Life and Death of Delaware’s Arbitration Experiment, Deal Book- THE 






generated $60,000 in revenue for the state.
28
 Of the six arbitrated cases, only one was 
reported in a one-and-a-half page order.
29
 In fact, arbitrations of the sort normally don’t 
even make it on the court’s public docketing system.
30
 The new program had no chance 
of survival, for only nine months after its inception, in October of 2011, the Delaware 
Coalition for Open Government (DELCOG)
31
 filed suit with the principal claim that the 
secret proceedings violated the public’s First Amendment qualified right of access to 
criminal and civil trials.
32
 
III. THE END: DELAWARE COALITION FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT V. HONORABLE LEO 
E. STRINE, JR., ET AL. 
A. Excuse Me, I’d Like to Lodge a Complaint!  
 On Tuesday October 25, 2011, DELCOG filed a Complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware. Named in the complaint are the five judges 
currently sitting on the Delaware Court of Chancery
33
 , the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
and the State of Delaware. The complaint alleged that the Delaware law,
34
 along with 
Chancery Court Rules 96, 97 and 98 collectively deprive the public of a right of 
[contemporaneous] access to judicial proceedings and records, as is bestowed upon them 
by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
35
 Specifically, 
DELCOG instituted the action because it believes that the secret proceedings provided 
for by the above mentioned Delaware statute and Rules are not arbitral proceedings but 
are, in fact, trials in disguise.
36
 Therefore, if the proceedings are not actually 
“arbitrations” but are confidential litigation proceedings, DELCOG has a viable 42 
U.S.C. §1983 claim for a violation of the First Amendment.
37
 The complaint explains 
DELCOG’s “litigation not arbitration” theory saying in relevant part: 




 See Chrysalis Ventures III, L.P. v. Mobile Armor, Inc, Arb. No. 001-A-2011 -VCL, C.A. No. 6069-
VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2011). It is worth noting here that the order contains no substantive information 
about the nature of the case and is only available on the Lexis File and Serve system, one must be a 
member to use this cite – membership is not free. See id. 
30
 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, *9 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012). 
31
 The Delaware Coalition for Open Government is a state affiliate of the National Freedom of 
Information Coalition and is “committed to promoting and defending the people's right to transparency and 
accountability in government,” more information about the Delaware Coalition for Open Government can 
be found on their website at  http://www.delcog.org/index.php/about/#missionstatement. 
32
 Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, at *2. 
33
 The named judges are: Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Hon. John W. Noble, Hon. Donald F. Parsons, Jr., 
Hon. Sam Glasscock, III, Delaware Court of Chancery, Hon. J. Travis Laster. 
34
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §349 (West 2009). 
35
 Complaint at ¶¶ 18-20, Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012) 




 Id. at ¶ 19. 
37
 Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. 
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Although the statute and rules call the procedure “arbitration,” it is really 
litigation under another name. Although procedure may vary slightly, the 
parties still examine witnesses before and present evidence to the 
Arbitrator (a sitting judge), who makes findings of fact, interprets the 
applicable law and applies the law to the facts, and then awards relief 
which may be enforced as any other court judgment. The only difference 
is that now these procedures and rulings occur behind closed doors instead 
of in open court.
38
  
To be fair, arbitrations are usually conducted in this way, and those proceedings are 
private without so much as a peep on the process’ legality from naysayers. The 
outstanding attribute of the Delaware arbitration law that supports DELCOG’s theory is 
the fact that sitting judges arbitrate the cases, and not say the usual perpetrators, like 
retired judges and attorneys. 
 Not surprisingly, various press organizations viewed things through DELCOG’s 
eyes and sided with the nonprofit organization, showing support by way of submitting 
briefs to the court. These organizations include: The Associated Press, The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
39
 
Equally predictable are the supporters of the Delaware law, the list is comprised of 
entities sympathetic to the needs of companies faced with corporate discord needing 
quick, economic, and quiet resolve. The list of supporters who submitted briefs to the 
court in favor of the Delaware arbitration program features the Corporate Law Section of 
the Delaware State Bar Association, The New York Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ 
Stock Market.
40
 This became a battle between the upright citizens who sought to protect 
the rights guaranteed to them by the United States Constitution, and big businesses who 
sought to save money by having quick, secret proceedings, adjudged by the best of the 
best: sitting judges on the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
B. The Case to End all Arbitrations 
 The United States District Court for the District of Delaware, under Judge Mary 
McLaughlin, granted Plaintiff DELCOG’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 
ruled the Delaware law creating confidential arbitration proceedings an unconstitutional 
violation of the First Amendment’s qualified right of access to civil trials.
41
  




 See Steven M. Davidoff, The Life and Death of Delaware’s Arbitration Experiment, Deal Book - 





 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, *1 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012). 
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1. “Where Secrets or Mystery Begins, Vice or Roguery is Not Far Off” – 
Samuel Johnson : There’s Just Something About a Secret that Makes 
People Uncomfortable 
 On August 30, 2012, Judge McLaughlin, sitting in Philadelphia,
42
 agreed with 
DELCOG’s theory of the case and decided the fate of the Delaware program, putting it to 
rest, if only temporarily.
43
 It is clear from the opinion that the merit of DELCOG’s First 
Amendment claims is found in the fact that sitting judges of one of the nation’s most 
prominent and powerful courts are keeping secrets for the corporate world, all in the 
name of private arbitration.
44
 
 The court began its 26 page opinion by outlining the Delaware law and the 
accompanying Chancery Court Rules.
45
 The Court analogized the case to Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.
46
 In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the “First Amendment prevents the government from denying the public access to 
historically open government proceedings.”
47
 While Richmond Newspapers dealt 
specifically with a criminal trial, the Court went on to note the benefits of public 
accountability in the court system generally. As accounted by Chief Justice Burger in 
Richmond Newspapers: 
Public accountability encourages honesty from witnesses and reasoned 
decision making by jurists. Accessible court proceedings serve an 
educational function, informing the public about the judicial system and 
the important social and legal issues raised by many cases. Judicial rulings 
are more easily accepted and mistakes are more quickly corrected when 
the subject to the scrutiny of public and press. Access to criminal trials 
thus improves both the functioning of the judicial system and public 
confidence in its fairness. Given the experience of public openness and the 
benefits of that practice, the Court found that the First Amendment 
protects the public's right to access historically open proceedings.
48
 
Even If the opinion didn’t open with the holding, audiences would have known where the 
court was going at this point. It is clear only thirteen pages into the opinion that the case 
was won; the court decided that Delaware’s arbitration program was indeed a trial 
proceeding and not in fact arbitration.
49
 In actuality, however, the case Supreme Court 
case that put the nail in Delaware’s coffin dealt with criminal trials specifically.
50
 There 
                                                 
42
 All the eligible Delaware judges recused themselves. 
43
 Defendants have already appealed the decision. 
44
 See generally Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, at *8-9.  
45
 Id. at *4-5. 
46




 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, at *13 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012) (paraphrasing 
Berger, C.J., in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 555 at 573).  
49
 See id. at *12-14 (discussing plaintiffs’ right of access in civil trials and proceedings sufficiently like 
trials).  
50
 See id. (referring to Richmond Newspapers). 
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is, however, precedent among the circuit courts, as well as the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, that a right of access exists in civil trials as well as criminal.
51
 
 The court admits that the public’s interests in the matters of a criminal trial are 
different (read: lesser) than their interests in the happenings in private disputes between 
private citizens and entities.
52
 However, the opinion comes full circle shortly thereafter 
when the court  nevertheless justifies their position by highlighting the fact that the 
business of sitting judges is the business of the public, and therefore any proceedings they 
preside over must be done in the view of the public eye: 
But the actions of those charged with administering justice through the 
judiciary is always a public matter. Openness of civil trials promotes the 
integrity of the courts and the perception of fairness essential to their 
legitimacy. Public dissemination of the facts of a civil trial can encourage 
those with information to come forward, and public attention can 
discourage witnesses from perjury.
53
 
The court further reiterated the articulated need for transparency in judicial proceedings 
by citing the “six benefits of open judicial proceedings, both criminal and civil” as 




2. Arbitration v. Litigation : The Court’s Analysis 
 The Third Circuit test for determining whether the public has a  right of access to 
a specific record or proceeding is that of “logic and experience”: 
First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of 
experiences, we have considered whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public . . . Second, in this 
setting the Court has traditionally considered whether public access plays 




                                                 
51
 See id. at *14 (citing: Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Rushford v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988);  [15] Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983); Matter of Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1309 (7th 
Cir. 1984); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
52
 Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980 at *15-16. 
53
 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, *15-16 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012). 
54
 N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (listing the six benefits of 
judicial proceedings: “[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the 
public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; [2] promotion of the public perception 
of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] providing a 
significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion; [4] 
serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement 
of the performance of all involved; and [6] discouragement of perjury.”). 
55
 Id. at 208-09 (quoting In Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. at 81 (U.S. 1986)). 
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This is the test the Defendants asserted was apposite in this case. However, in order to 
reach that test, the case at hand must be one involving an arbitration as opposed to a 
“procedure ‘sufficiently like a trial.”
56
 The logic and experience test would almost 
certainly yield the result desired by the Defendants, for the history of arbitration features 
confidential proceedings, thereby making it logical that this arbitration program could 
also, constitutionally, be legally confidential. However, the Defendants cannot ignore the 
precedent set by Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen.
57
 In Publicker Industries, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the reasoning of Richmond Newspapers applies to 
civil trials,
58
 thereby granting the public a right of access to civil trials and negating the 
need to determine the same by way of the logic and experience test. Following this 
precedent, the Plaintiffs proposed that Publicker Industries applies here, and therefore the 
court should not reach the logic and experience test for the same reason. This is the 
“threshold question” that lead to the court’s engagement in an ‘arbitration verses 
litigation’ analysis. 
 In finding that the Delaware arbitration program was litigation cloaked in 
arbitration garb, the court listed the attributes of arbitration and litigation, and the 
differences between judges and arbitrators to reach the conclusion that:  
The Delaware proceeding, although bearing the label arbitration, is 
essentially a civil trial . . . Because the Court finds that the Delaware 
procedure is a civil judicial proceeding, it is not necessary to [utilize] the 
experience and logic test . . . The public benefits of openness are not 
outweighed by the Defendants' speculation that such openness will drive 
parties to use alternative non-public fora to resolve their disputes . . . the 
judiciary as a whole is strengthened by the public knowledge that its 
courthouses are open and judicial officers are not adjudicating in secret.
59
 
The public benefits of Delaware’s global domination as the home of corporations, the 
efficient handling of corporate disputes, and a better economy in Delaware did not phase 
this court. Ironically, since there was no trial on the merits of this case, the Delaware 
Defendants were subject to a process similar to one they were trying to institute: an 
abbreviated, less expensive, swift act of judicial resolve of a complex dispute. 
Nevertheless, it is back to the drawing board for Delaware on this issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION: DO YOU BELIEVE IN LIFE AFTER DEATH?  
 To the Delaware State Legislature and the Chancellors at the Court of 
Chancery,  losing the case only meant that a battle was lost, not the war. The Defendants 
have already  appealed Judge McLaughlin’s decision, making it clear that this ruling will 
not be the last the world hears of the innovative, yet currently unconstitutional, Delaware 
law. It is clear that the Defendants genuinely believe that the Delaware arbitration 
program is a step in the right direction for their state, and their future viability on the 
                                                 
56
 Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, *20 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012). 
57
 Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). 
58
 Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980 at *14. 
59
 Id. at *27, *30-31. 
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world’s market for corporate dispute resolution. A Republican member of the Delaware 
House Judiciary committee said on the matter, “We want to stay competitive. We want 
[the] Chancery Court to have the best tools possible. It's really important for employment 
and it is a significant generator of revenue."
60
 
 Keeping hope alive, members of the Delaware legal community are already 
talking reform and strategies for appeal. Among the major areas of the law needing 
reform are the strict privacy provisions in conjunction with sitting judges serving as 
arbitrators. It has been reported that lawmakers are considering both making the final 
hearings public and using retired Chancery Court judges to preside of the proceedings.
61
 
However, mandating public arbitration hearings takes away the parties’ treasured 
freedom to craft their own arbitration proceedings by agreement. And, limits the effects 
of the decision to those parties involved in the arbitration, notwithstanding concerns of 
the public. The latter provision would take the lure of the supreme expertise that 
Delaware was trying to capitalize on out of the program, thus making it resemble the 
several existing court annexed arbitration programs across the country.
62
 Something has 
to be done to alleviate the fear of big businesses settling multimillion dollar disputes in 
secret, all with the backing of one of the nation’s most powerful judiciaries. If this 
Delaware law is to resurrect itself, one thing is certain: novelty is needed; but as of now, 
spectators must wait and see which way the Delaware State Legislature will go in trying 
to make this law work and the result of the current appeal. 
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 Tom Hals, Backers of Secret Delaware Arbitrations See Grounds For Appeal, Thomson Reuters 
News & Insight (Sep. 10, 2012), available at 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/09_-
_September/Backers_of_secret_Delaware_arbitrations_see_grounds_for_appeal/. 
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